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Abstract 
 
Using a unique international dataset, we show that the CEOs of large banks exhibit an increased 
probability of forced turnover when their organizations are more exposed to idiosyncratic tail risks. 
The importance of idiosyncratic tail risk in CEO dismissals is strengthened when there is more 
competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of 
distress. Overall, we document that the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to 
bank boards on the quality of the choices made by CEOs and these signals are different from those 
provided by accounting and market measures of bank performance and by idiosyncratic volatility. 
In contrast, systematic tail risk is usually filtered out from the firing decision, only becoming 
important for forced CEO turnovers in the presence of a major variation in the costs that the 
exposure to this risk generates for shareholders and the organization. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the CEOs of large banks have incentives to implement business 
policies that increase their organizations’ exposure to risks (Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013; Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). These business policies are motivated by the highly levered nature 
of banks that provides CEOs with risk-taking incentives given the convexity of their stock and 
option holdings.  
While shareholders are not against executives taking risks, because equity is an out-of-the-
money call option whose value is increasing with risk (Acharya and Ryan, 2016; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), they do not have a preference for risks that can be particularly detrimental for 
the survival of the bank (Stulz, 2015). In this respect, the literature sees a bank’s growing exposure 
to tail risks, measuring the possibility of suffering extremely large losses, as a pivotal example of a 
risk exposure that could be excessive and dangerous for the organization (Cordella and Yeyati, 
2003; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; Park and Peristiani, 2007). 
To put it differently, an exposure to tail risks tends to reward shareholders with positive returns in 
many scenarios, but it also leads to a small probability that extremely large losses materialize and 
undermine a bank’s longer-term survival (Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; 
Thanassoulis, 2013). 
The purpose of this paper is to understand whether increases in tail risk contribute to raising 
the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in large banks. To this end, we present the first cross-
country study of CEO turnovers in the banking industry based on a sample of 261 large banks 
selected from 46 countries for the period 2004-2013.  
Whether any link exists between tail risk and the likelihood of a CEO turnover in large banks 
lacks empirical evidence. This is particularly unfortunate given that dismissal is potentially an 
important mechanism to discipline CEOs by bank boards and reduce the chances that they overly 
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expose their banks to extreme risks.  In fact, dismissal might lead not only to the loss of current 
employment but also the loss of unvested equity-based compensation (Dahiya and Yermack, 2008) 
and reduced future career opportunities (Brickley et al., 1999).  
Our analysis is guided by conventional theoretical models proposed for non-financial firms 
where boards employ performance, volatility and other signals to evaluate CEO choices (Bushman 
et al., 2010; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). When these 
signals indicate bad outcomes for the corporation that are imputable to a lack of CEO ability or a 
lack of CEO effort in the decision making, they lead to a CEO dismissal by the board. Along these 
lines, we argue that tail risk conveys different and additional signals, as compared to stock 
performance and volatility, of possible bad outcomes for the bank that can be related to CEO 
choices.  
To be more precise, an increasing exposure to tail risks, making a bank more vulnerable to 
events that can lead to extremely large losses and to a financial distress (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013), 
signals that the bank might find it more difficult and costly to conduct its business (Stulz, 2015). 
For instance, increases in tail risks lead to additional costs for shareholders related to the 
monitoring role of bank creditors and regulators. Both creditors and regulators do not benefit 
from the upside gains deriving from bank risk-taking while they bear the cost of the downside. It 
follows that especially in the presence of a growing tail risk exposure, creditors can significantly 
increase the risk-premium charged on bank debts and reduce the amount of available funds for 
the bank (Flannery, 2001; Schaeck et al., 2011; Stulz, 2015). At the same time, regulators might 
more closely monitor banks and offer negative signals on their financial health with the 
consequence to reduce share prices and further increase borrowing costs (Berger and Davies, 1998; 
DeYoung et al., 2001; Slovin et al., 1999). 
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In our study we follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van Bekkum (2016) and use Expected 
Shortfall (ES) as our primary measure of bank tail risk. ES quantifies the downside of bank risk in 
the form of extremely large negative stock returns. ES is, therefore, a particularly appropriate signal 
that a bank is overly exposed to extreme risks that are detrimental to bank value. Furthermore, 
following studies that investigate the role of volatility in CEO dismissal in non-financial 
corporations (Bushman et al., 2010), we build our analysis on the distinction between idiosyncratic 
and systematic tail risk, with the former being seen as more directly linked to managerial choices.   
By focusing on tail risk, our work is related to the stream of research that emphasizes the 
importance of going beyond the investigations of (average) stock returns and profitability in order 
to explain forced CEO turnovers in corporations (see, for instance, Brickley, 2003). This type of 
investigation is the focus of earlier studies on CEO turnovers in the banking industry (see Hubbard 
and Palia, 1995). Furthermore, our paper extends and complements the analysis conducted on 
small US community banks by Schaeck et al. (2011) where the authors show that an increase in 
bank default risk (measured by the accounting Z-score) raises the likelihood of a forced CEO 
turnover due to the disciplinary role played by shareholders.  
Differently from the existing studies, we show the importance of accounting for tail risk in 
examining the decision to remove a CEO by the boards of large banks. We find a positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and forced (but not voluntary) CEO turnover, while we 
document that the exposure to systematic tail risk does not generally influence the firing decision. 
Furthermore, we show that our result is not related to idiosyncratic tail risk capturing a poor 
performance effect or simply an idiosyncratic volatility effect, as in the model proposed by 
Bushman et al. (2010), and holds under different empirical settings, including changes in the way 
we compute bank tail risk. 
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A key consequence of the above results is that the importance of idiosyncratic tail risk, but not 
systematic tail risk, for the firing decision should depend on the banking market structure as the 
possibility that boards infer signals to evaluate CEO choices is argued to be lower in more 
concentrated (less competitive) industries (DeFond and Park, 1999; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker 2017). 
This is because CEOs operating in more concentrated industries are less likely to be subject to 
similar uncertainties (DeFond and Park, 1999), have less peers (Brickley, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; 
Yonker, 2017), and their outputs are more likely to be influenced by the actions of other CEOs in 
the same industry (Holmstrom, 1982). Consistent with the view that the market structure 
influences the ability of the boards to identify unfit CEOs, we find that the sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnovers to idiosyncratic tail risk is lower in more concentrated banking markets, but this 
is not the case for systematic tail risk. 
We next evaluate which stakeholders amplify the importance of tail risk for forced CEO 
turnovers. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on how different bank stakeholders react to 
downside risks in banks (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). We show that the sensitivity of CEO dismissals 
to idiosyncratic tail risk increases with a larger presence of subordinated debtholders (namely 
debtholders that are liable to incur potentially larger losses in the case of a bank distress) or 
shareholders with lower diversification opportunities. To put it differently, our analysis suggests 
that idiosyncratic tail risk plays a more important role for the firing decision of large bank CEOs 
in the presence of stakeholders that have more to lose in the case of distress. 
The final part of our analysis looks more closely at a bank’s exposure to systematic tail risk.  In 
the case of large banks, there are specific factors that go against the argument that any exposure 
to systematic tail risk is completely unrelated to managerial choices. In particular, recent banking 
studies suggest that bank CEOs have incentives to manufacture non-firm-specific tail risks and to 
engage in systematic risk-taking (modelled as an endogenous choice) to extract value from the 
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financial safety net (Acharya et al., 2017; Acharya and Yorumazer, 2007; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2016; Bushman and Williams, 2015; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006).  
To understand how boards perceive systematic tail risk in large banks, we test for the presence 
of variation in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk when there are changes 
in the consequences a bank can suffer from being exposed to this risk. By using several alternative 
empirical settings, we consistently find that the exposure to systematic tail risk becomes more (less) 
important for CEO dismissal when such exposure is deemed to be more (less) costly for a bank. 
For instance, we find that the sensitivity of CEO forced turnover to systematic tail risk is 
significantly larger after a bank is included in the list of global systemically important financial 
institutions by the Financial Stability Board. For these institutions, regulatory costs are linked to 
the systemic effects they produce (see Bongini et al., 2015) and the removal from the list occurs 
only when they no longer pose a global systemic threat. All in all, our tests indicate that the 
specificities of banks play a crucial role in the way bank boards see the exposure to systematic tail 
risk. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why tail risks should matter 
for forced CEO turnovers in large banks. Section 3 describes the sample, econometric methods 
and variables. Section 4 examines the impact of a bank’s idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk 
exposure on the likelihood of a CEO turnover, while Section 5 offers conclusions.   
2. CEO Turnovers and the Tail Risk Exposure of Large Banks 
2.1 Tail Risk as a Signal of Bad Managerial Choice 
The existing literature offers little guidance on whether risk, and tail risk in particular, matters 
for the board decision of large banks to fire a CEO. Studies on non-financial corporations have 
mostly emphasized the importance of corporate performance for CEO turnover (Brickley, 2003; 
Chakraborty et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2003; Farell and Whidbee, 2003; Fisman et al., 2014; Guo 
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and Masulis, 2015; Hazarika et al., 2012; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). An exception is Bushman et 
al. (2010) who argue that, for a given level of corporate performance, a higher level of idiosyncratic 
volatility increases the probability of a forced CEO turnover as it signals uncertainty about CEO 
talent.  
Similarly, with the exception of Schaeck et al. (2011), who focus on the importance of 
accounting default risk for forced CEO turnovers in US community banks, the limited number of 
studies on banks has only investigated the influence of performance (Hubbard and Palia, 1995) 
and the role of regulatory scrutiny on the turnover decision (Palvia, 2011; Webb, 2008).  
In general, conventional theoretical models of CEO dismissal are built around the idea that 
boards assess the quality of CEO choices on the basis of performance, volatility and other signals 
(Bushman et al., 2010; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). 
These signals lead to the dismissal of the CEO when they indicate bad outcomes for the 
corporation and when these outcomes are due to a lack of CEO ability or CEO effort in the 
decision making (bad choices). Using this setting as a starting point, we expect that increasing a 
bank’s tail risk amplifies the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover. In other words, we postulate 
that tail risk offers signals of possible bad outcomes for the corporation that are not contained in 
measures of performance and volatility and that are the result of CEO (bad) choices.  
In respect to the above, the extant literature shows that a bank’s exposure to tail risks, 
measuring the possibility of extremely large losses, is conventionally seen as signalling a risk 
exposure that may be excessive (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hellmann 
et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; Park and Peristiani, 2007). More precisely, shareholders want the CEO 
to take risks that are not detrimental to the corporation (Stulz, 2015), while an exposure to tail 
risks signals that a bank can be subject to extremely negative events that might threaten its survival. 
Furthermore, a growing exposure to tail risks can also substantially affect the short-term value of 
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the bank. For instance, this exposure might lead to funding restrictions by creditors (especially if 
they are not protected by deposit insurance) and increased funding costs (Flannery, 2001; Schaeck 
et al., 2011; Stulz, 2015). 
 In addition, and differently from non-financial firms, banks are subject to monitoring by 
regulators who are concerned with the effects of bank tail risks on financial stability. The 
consequent growing regulatory scrutiny due to tail risks has the potential to negatively influence 
shareholder wealth in several ways. Specifically, DeYoung et al. (2001) show that supervisory 
inspections that convey bad news lead to an increase in the borrowing costs of large commercial 
banks, while Berger and Davies (1998) and Slovin et al. (1999) find that negative regulatory 
assessments are associated with a decline in stock prices. Moreover, in the presence of an excessive 
risk exposure, regulators have the power to prohibit certain bank activities, to dismiss bank 
managers, and even to close down the bank (De Young et al., 2001; Schaeck et al., 2011).3  
In summary, an increasing exposure to tail risks amplifies bank distress costs and leads to the 
probability of losses in bank value caused by the monitoring role of bank creditors and regulators. 
It follows that a board should consider firing the CEO whenever a growing exposure to tail risks 
is associated with a lack of CEO ability or CEO effort in terms of risk-management. 
2.2 Sources of Tail Risks and Forced CEO Turnovers 
Conventional theoretical models on CEO dismissal in non-financial firms highlight also the 
importance of distinguishing the sources of a firm’s risk exposure to understand the drivers of the 
                                                 
3 In a cross-country setting, the regulatory influence is confirmed by a 2012 WorldBank survey. The survey shows 
that in the presence of excessively risky policies, regulators might impose costly actions for shareholders such as a 
stop to dividend payments or the enforcement of a capital restoration plan. Furthermore, around 90% of the national 
supervisors have the powers to exercise enforcement actions that lead to the removal of bank managers and directors. 
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firing decision. CEO choices are normally expected to influence the idiosyncratic component, but 
not the systematic component of risk. Accordingly, any type of systematic risk (including tail risk) 
should be seen as a manifestation of an exogenous event and as such not relevant to the firing 
decision (see for instance Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013; Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Kaplan and 
Minton, 2012, where CEO turnover in non-financial firms is linked to the relative performance 
evaluation framework). Using a different theoretical setting, Bushman et al. (2010) argue that, 
differently from idiosyncratic volatility, an increase in systematic volatility reduces the likelihood 
of a forced turnover as it makes it more problematic for boards to infer indications of CEO talent.  
It might be argued, however, that there are some specificities in the case of the tail risk of large 
banks that go against the argument that any exposure to systematic sources of risk is unrelated to 
CEO choices.4 For instance, the presence of implicit and explicit government guarantees within 
the banking industry can induce bank CEOs to favor business policies that generate systematic tail 
risks or increase a bank’s exposure to systematic tail risks (see Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 
2006). Similarly, Acharya et al. (2010) argue that the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 is primarily 
                                                 
4 A possible endogeneity is, for instance, recognized within the macro-prudential view of banking regulation that 
has grown in importance post the global financial crisis (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Under this approach large banks are 
subject to additional rules and discipline motivated by the potential effects of their risk-taking on overall financial 
stability and not simply on the stability of individual banks. One example in this direction is Section 121 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, approved in July 2010, where the Federal Reserve might prevent mergers and acquisitions, restrict the 
products a firm is allowed to offer, terminate activities, and sell assets whenever a bank (larger than $50 billion in 
terms of total assets) poses a “grave threat to the financial stability of the United States.” Furthermore, systemically 
important banks, as identified at the domestic or at the global level, are subject to additional prudential requirements 
under the macro-prudential regulatory approach proposed by the international capital standards after the crisis and 
known as Basel III. 
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the consequence of large and complex financial institutions manufacturing systematic tail risks. In 
addition, Bushman and Williams (2015) demonstrate that, via their loan loss recognition policy, 
bank managers generate tail risks that have negative implications for the whole banking industry. 
Furthermore, Pennacchi (2006) argues that banks are inclined to favor lending and off-balance 
sheet activities with high exposure to systematic risks, as these business choices increase the value 
of their deposit insurance subsidy. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the banking literature does not see the exposure to systematic tail 
risk as being entirely unrelated to managerial choices does not necessarily imply that this exposure 
should matter for bank CEO dismissal.  In fact, by increasing the exposure to systematic tail risks, 
a bank can increase the probability of receiving a government bailout that transfers the bank’s 
losses to taxpayers. This is because these losses materialize in periods when also other banks are 
in trouble and regulators intend to preserve confidence in the banking industry by avoiding bank 
failures (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). Similarly, an increasing exposure to systematic tail risks increases 
the probability of delaying the closure of a bank in distress, as the distress typically occurs in 
periods when regulators aim to avoid panic (see e.g. Acharya, 2009; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 
2007; Bolton et al., 2015; Brown and Dinc, 2011). It follows that the exposure to systematic tail 
risks may be perceived by bank boards as being less damaging and dangerous for shareholders and 
the bank than the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risks.  
 To summarize, the arguments indicating that bank boards should account for bank tail risk in 
the CEO firing decision are expected to be primarily valid for the idiosyncratic component of this 
risk. Differently from systematic tail risk, idiosyncratic tail risk is not only more likely to be 
perceived by a bank board as the result of CEO lack of ability or effort in managing risks but might 
also be seen as more likely to be detrimental for shareholders and the bank. 
3. Data, Econometric and Variables   
  
10 
3.1 Data 
The analysis is based on a sample of listed, large commercial banks and bank holding companies 
with accounting data available from BankScope by Bureau van Dijk and market data available from 
Datastream International. We select the sampled banks from an initial list that included the top 
500 listed large commercial banks and bank holding companies in terms of total assets at the end 
of 2004, as identified by BankScope. Our sample period is from 2004 to 2013. From this initial list 
we retain only banks for which we are able to collect governance data (including data on CEOs) 
from annual and governance reports. We also search for governance information from various 
relevant databases, such as Bloomberg, Business Week, Forbes and S&P Capital IQ. This reduces 
the sample size to approximately 300 banks. 
As explained in the next section, our empirical model employs lagged explanatory variables to 
estimate the likelihood of a CEO turnover. Therefore, the first CEO turnover event we record 
begins in January 2005 and the last turnover occurs in December 2013. This results in an initial 
sample of 342 turnover events. We then exclude turnovers where a temporary CEO was appointed 
during a time of transition or turnovers that were associated with mergers occurring over the same 
period.  
Next, we classify the remaining turnovers as forced or voluntary by conducting a manual search 
of news articles that explain the reason for each outgoing CEO. Our final classification follows 
Huson et al. (2001) and Parrino (1997). 5  Furthermore, to minimize classification errors, we 
                                                 
5 We classify a CEO turnover as forced if any of the following conditions are met: a) the announcement reports 
that the departing CEO was fired or dismissed; b) the outgoing CEO left because of poor performance, had a conflict 
of opinion with the board, or was under pressure from the board due to accounting scandals; c) the outgoing CEO is 
under the retirement age of 60 years but does not leave the firm for health reasons or to take up another job outside 
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conduct additional investigations to validate whether the turnover was voluntary; namely, 
explaining if it was motivated by retirement, resignation for personal reasons or to pursue a new 
business, or by the outgoing CEO taking up another post in the same firm or a new job elsewhere. 
Finally, we remove turnovers where no reliable data could be found for the reason behind the 
CEO’s departure.  
After imposing the described selection criteria, our final sample consists of accounting and 
market data for 1994 observations (261 unique banks chartered in 46 countries) from 2004 to 
2012. Our sample size is similar to two recent cross-country studies that focus on the cross-
sectional relationship between bank governance and performance during the global financial crisis 
(see Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). The sample of CEO turnovers includes 74 
forced turnovers and 198 voluntary turnovers for the period 2005-2013. The proportion of forced 
turnovers is in line with the figures reported by studies on non-financial firms (Bushman et al., 
2010; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country. As in previous cross-country 
studies (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012), a large number of banks are concentrated in 
Japan and the US, representing 16.75% and 16.80% of the total number of observations, 
respectively. For the remaining countries, the share in terms of total observations does not exceed 
5%. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of turnovers by year and there is no obvious trend 
in CEO turnovers. 
                                                 
the firm; d) the turnover resulted from re-organization or re-structuring attempts initiated by the board or the 
government. 
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3.2 Econometric Method 
In our sample of CEO turnovers, there are two key CEO exit mechanisms; 1) being dismissed, 
2) leaving voluntarily. The two types of turnovers are mutually exclusive and compete with each 
other as potential exit mechanisms for managers in a given bank. Therefore, following Gregory-
Smith et al. (2009) and Hazarika et al. (2012) and using the complete data about firms with no 
CEO turnover, forced turnovers and voluntary turnovers, we adopt a competing risks hazard 
model to account for the fact that forced turnovers are not the only exit mechanism for CEOs 
(see the Appendix). 
The dependent variable of the model is CEO tenure (defined as the number of years a CEO 
held his/her chief executive position) and all independent variables are lagged by one year to 
reduce simultaneity and endogeneity concerns. Under this empirical setting, the impact of each 
determinant varies for different types of CEO turnover. We describe the covariates used in our 
empirical analysis in the following sections.   
3.3 Measuring Bank Idiosyncratic and Systematic Tail Risk 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van Bekkum (2016) we use Expected Shortfall (ES) as 
our primary measure of a bank’s tail risk exposure. ES quantifies the downside of bank risk in the 
form of extreme negative stock returns.   
We estimate idiosyncratic and systematic ES using the historical approach based on realized 
returns. In general, the historical approach relies on the assumption that the realized exposure to 
extreme risks offers valuable indications on the expected exposure to these risks. In line with this 
view, Acharya et al. (2017) show that measures of extreme bank risk computed before the crisis 
predicted stock performance during the global crisis. ES is a common tool used in bank financial 
risk management (Acharya et al., 2017; Yamai and Yoshiba, 2005) where the historical approach 
is widely applied. For instance, Perignon and Smith (2010) show that historical simulation is by far 
  
13 
the most popular estimation method employed by large banks over the period 1996-2005 to 
quantify their exposure to extreme market risks. This is not entirely surprising given that Bali et al. 
(2009) show that the historical approach delivers results that are very similar to those obtained 
through more sophisticated methodologies that may require more restrictive assumptions.  
More formally, for bank i, ES is the average daily return below the 5th percentile of the yearly 
distribution (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Van Bekkum, 2016) and can be expressed as:6 
ESi
𝛼=-E[Ri,t|Ri,t < Ri,T
𝛼 ]      (1) 
where Ri,t is the daily stock return for bank i at day t and Ri,T
𝛼  is a bank’s daily stock return equal 
to the 𝛼  percentile (equal to the 5th percentile in our analysis) of the T yearly distribution. 
Conventionally, as shown in (1), to compute ES the average of the daily stock returns in the lower 
tail of the return distribution is multiplied by minus one such that higher values of ES indicate a 
higher bank exposure to extreme negative returns.  
However, as our predictions depend on the nature of a bank’s tail risk exposure, we need to 
estimate the idiosyncratic and systematic components of ES. To this end, we start by extracting 
the idiosyncratic component of bank daily stock returns via the residuals of an augmented market 
model, where daily bank returns are regressed on market returns and industry returns (both based 
on domestic indexes provided by Datastream) as shown below:7  
Ri,t=𝛽1+ 𝛽2Rm,t+𝛽3Rb,t+εj,t       (2) 
                                                 
6 For instance, with 200 daily stock returns and a 5th percentile equal to -2%, ES is the average daily return in the 
trading days where the daily stock returns are lower than -2%.  
7 As explained in Section 4.2, we also employ alternative specifications of the market model and confirm that the 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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where Ri,t is the return for stock i at time t, Rm,t is the daily return for the market index for each 
country, Rb,t is the daily return for the banking industry index for each country. 
We then compute idiosyncratic (systematic) ES using the residuals (the predicted values) 
obtained from equation (2) that captures the time series of idiosyncratic (systematic) returns. As a 
result, following equation (1), Idiosyncratic ES is the average idiosyncratic return below the 5th 
percentile of the yearly distribution of the residuals (𝜀ĵ,t)  from the market model. Whereas 
Systematic ES is the average return below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution of the predicted 
returns from the market model (𝑖. 𝑒. , ?̂?1+ ?̂?2Rm,t+?̂?3Rb,t).    
In additional tests, we employ an alternative systematic tail risk measure by using the approach 
proposed by Acharya et al. (2017). Under this approach, a bank’s exposure to extreme market-
wide events is defined by the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES); namely, the expected bank return 
when the market is under distress conditions: 
MESi
𝛼=-E[Ri,t|Rm,t<Rm,T
𝛼 ]      (3) 
where Ri,t is the return of bank i at time t, Rm,t is the market return at time t and Rm,T
𝛼  is the  stock 
market daily return corresponding to the 𝛼 (5th) percentile of the yearly distribution of daily market 
returns. Larger values of MES indicate lower bank returns in the presence of an extreme negative 
market condition.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics of our tail risk measures for three different groups 
of banks: banks with no CEO turnovers, banks with at least one forced CEO turnover, and banks 
with at least one voluntary CEO turnover. The mean idiosyncratic (systematic) ES for banks that 
experienced forced turnovers is 2.25% (3.50%), as compared to 2.06% (2.94%) for banks with no 
turnovers and the difference is statistically significant. By contrast, the mean (median) idiosyncratic 
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ES and systematic ES for banks with voluntary CEO turnovers are not statistically different from 
those of banks with no CEO turnovers.  
3.4 Bank Stock Performance and Volatility 
Previous studies show that CEO dismissals are extreme forms of pay-performance sensitivity, 
where poor performance leads to a greater likelihood of turnover (Huson et al., 2001; Parrino, 
1997). As our tail risk measures are based on the yearly stock return distribution, their impact on 
dismissal might then simply be the result of a poor performance effect. 
In our empirical setting we, therefore, account for stock performance. We construct measures 
of idiosyncratic and systematic stock returns based on the approach followed by Jenter and 
Kannan (2015). Specifically, we compute idiosyncratic and systematic stock returns by annualizing 
daily values of predicted and residual stock returns using equation (2).  
Stock return volatility is also an important driver of tail risk. Despite tail risk and volatility being 
closely related, Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) demonstrate that they can be affected 
differently by bank decisions in terms of business mix and by the degree of correlation among 
different forms of risk exposure.8 Nevertheless, previous studies show that stock volatility matters 
for the firing decision in non-financial firms. In particular, Bushman et al. (2010) argue that 
idiosyncratic volatility is an indicator of uncertainty about CEO talent that matters for the dismissal 
decision after controlling for bank performance. Accordingly, we also control for a volatility effect 
                                                 
8 Specifically, for a typical large internationally active bank, Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) demonstrate that 
different combinations of market, credit and operational risk exposures lead to a similar degree of bank volatility but 
different exposures to tail risk. This is because, typically, market risk exposures are characterized by higher volatility 
but shorter fat-tails in their distribution, while credit risk and operational risk exposures show an opposite pattern.  
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by including in the model idiosyncratic and systematic volatility components that we compute at 
a yearly frequency for the residual and predicted returns from equation (2). 
While Panel B of Table 2 reports summary statistics for our measures of stock performance 
and volatility, Panel C shows their (Pearson and Spearman) correlation coefficients with tail risk 
measures. All tail risk measures show a relatively low degree of correlation with measures of 
idiosyncratic and systematic performance, whereas they are clearly more correlated with volatility 
components. 9 In general, the correlation analysis confirms that tail risk and volatility, though 
correlated, capture different features of a bank’s risk exposure. 
3.5 Other Controls 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the other bank fundamentals that are potential determinants of CEO 
turnover (see Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Parrino, 1997; Schaeck et al., 2011). We control for 
accounting performance, based on a bank’s ROA, since a short-term profit measure is usually a 
key predictor of CEO dismissal (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Parrino, 1997). We also include 
industry ROA since poor industry performance also results in an increasing CEO dismissal risk 
(Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Schaeck et al., 2011). We measure bank-specific accounting 
performance as a bank’s ROA minus the mean ROA of the domestic banking sector (Profitability) 
and include the mean ROA (Industry Profitability) at the country level to account for general 
(systematic) industry performance. 
                                                 
9  More precisely the Pearson correlation coefficient between idiosyncratic (systematic) ES and idiosyncratic 
(systematic) returns is -0.34 (-0.37). The Pearson correlation between idiosyncratic (systematic) ES and idiosyncratic 
(systematic) volatility is instead approximately 0.81 (0.82). Nevertheless, in the online appendix, we show that there is 
a much lower degree of correlation between alternative measures of idiosyncratic (systematic) tail risk, employed in 
robustness tests, and idiosyncratic (systematic) volatility. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 We control for the size of a bank (Bank Size) by the log of total assets (in thousands of US 
dollars). Larger banks have a bigger pool of talented executives to replace the existing CEO and 
this should lead to a larger probability of CEO turnover (Chakraborty et al., 2007). We also include 
bank size squared, as we find evidence of a non-linearity in the relationship between CEO 
turnovers and size. Next, we control for the capital strength of a bank (Bank Capital), measured by 
the ratio between the book value of equity and the book value of bank assets, and a bank’s charter 
value (Charter Value), measured as the sum of the market value of a bank’s equity and the total 
book value of a bank’s liabilities all scaled by the book value of a bank’s assets. Lower equity capital 
and charter values (signaling lower growth opportunities) may trigger an increased risk-taking and 
greater levels of regulatory pressure to replace poorly performing CEOs (Schaeck et al., 2011).  
Panel B shows measures of bank internal governance and of external monitoring that can also 
impact the dismissal risk of CEOs (Laux, 2008; Yermack, 1996). For instance, smaller boards are 
associated with better performance and a greater threat of CEO dismissal (see, for instance, 
Yermack, 1996). More independent boards are expected to be more likely to challenge and replace 
an underperforming CEO (Laux, 2008; Weisbach, 1988), although entrenched CEOs may exert 
power over the board and reduce the likelihood of termination (Berger et al., 1997; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). Accordingly, we control for the log of the number of board members (Board Size) 
and for the degree of board independence (Independent Directors) measured by the ratio between 
independent directors and total board members. We include an index of CEO power (CEO Power) 
based on the sum of two binary variables: a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was internally 
promoted and a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board. 
We expect that more powerful CEOs are less likely to be dismissed.  
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Next, we control for the percentage of shares held by insiders excluding the CEO (Insider 
Ownership). Higher levels of insider ownership result in internalizing the costs of bank default 
(Booth et al., 2002) and are likely to lead to a greater likelihood of CEO dismissal (Huson et al., 
2001). However, higher levels of insider ownership could also lead to entrenchment and reduce 
the level of monitoring and discipline of CEOs (Denis et al., 1997; Goyal and Park, 2002).  
CEO turnovers might also depend on the strength of the risk governance within a bank. Risk 
committees (and the Chief Risk Officer) evaluate and communicate to the board the impact of 
managerial policies on the risk-profile of the bank (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Keys et al., 2009). 
We measure the strength of the risk-management function (Risk Governance) as the sum of two 
binary variables that take a value of one if there is a risk committee and if there is a Chief Risk 
Officer. 
We finally control for two sources of the external monitoring of bank managers. First, we 
control for the possible influence of bank regulation (Booth et al., 2002; Schaeck et al., 2011) by 
including the general strength of the supervisory agency (Supervisory Power) from Barth et al. (2004) 
and the subsequent surveys conducted by the World Bank.10 Second, we control for the percentage 
of bank stock owned by institutional investors (Institutional Ownership). Recent theoretical evidence 
shows that institutional shareholders can discipline firm management by the threat of exit (Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011). Furthermore, institutional shareholders are likely 
to show better skills in assessing CEOs relative to their peers. 
                                                 
10 In the case of banks, another source of monitoring is the presence of subordinated debt-holders. While we do 
not control for this in our preferred specification, due to the large number of missing values in our dataset, we conduct 
additional tests in section 4.5 where this disciplinary channel is explicitly taken into account. 
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Finally, Panel C reports additional country controls. The first is the concentration of the 
banking market (Bank Concentration) measured as the log transformation of the Herfindahl index 
of bank deposits in each country. In less concentrated markets, board members can accurately 
benchmark CEO performance to peers and identify poorly performing executives (Holmstrom, 
1982). Consistent with this, DeFond and Park (1999) and Goyal and Park (2002) show that in 
industries with low levels of concentration there is a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
Further, a more concentrated market might result in lower discipline because of the lower number 
of peers in the external market for executives, with a consequent increase in the difficulty of 
replacing an incumbent CEO (Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 2017). 
We then include a country-level index from the World Bank database on Doing Business 
(Director Liability Index) that measures the power of shareholders to implicate directors for self-
interested behavior. We expect a greater likelihood of CEO turnover in countries where 
shareholder power is higher. We also control for the degree of regulatory restrictions placed on 
bank activities (Activity Restrictions) from the World Bank regulatory dataset. In countries with a 
more complex banking business, bank boards could find it more difficult to understand a bank’s 
business model and the related signals for the firing decision.   
Next, the GDP per capita (Development) accounts for the degree of economic development of a 
country that might affect the monitoring ability of stakeholders and consequently the probability 
of forced turnovers. We use the ratio between the fiscal balance and country GDP (Fiscal Capacity) 
to capture the possibility that countries with a larger budget balance are more likely to extend 
government guarantees to weak banks (Brown and Dinc, 2011). As in Houston et al. (2010), we 
also control for country size (Size of Economy) through the log of domestic GDP in millions of US 
dollars to account for the fact that a few large economies may be driving our results and for the 
inflation rate (Inflation).   
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4.  Tail Risk and CEO Turnover 
4.1 Does a Bank’s Tail Risk Exposure Matter? 
We begin our empirical analysis by first estimating a baseline specification for the full sample 
of CEO turnovers with idiosyncratic and systematic ES as the key explanatory variables and 
controlling for bank fundamentals (including stock return and volatility components) and country 
characteristics. We then extend the baseline specification with the addition of measures of internal 
and external monitoring mechanisms that might affect the firing decision (column (2)).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results, reported in Table 4, provide consistent evidence that the hazard rate of a forced 
CEO turnover is positively associated with idiosyncratic bank tail risk: idiosyncratic ES enters all 
models with a positive coefficient that is significant at customary levels.11 In contrast, idiosyncratic 
and systematic ES are not significantly associated with the hazard of a voluntary turnover. Hence, 
a CEO’s decision to voluntarily leave a bank does not depend on the bank’s exposure to tail risk. 
Our results for forced turnovers are also economically significant: a one standard deviation 
increase in idiosyncratic ES leads to an increase in CEO dismissal risk by approximately 61% using 
the coefficients obtained from model (2).12 Moreover, all these tests show that systematic tail risk 
does not influence CEO forced turnover. This conclusion also holds when we follow Acharya et 
                                                 
11 Our results are not affected by the high correlation between tail risk and volatility components. We achieve 
similar conclusions when we re-estimate the models without idiosyncratic and systematic volatility as control variables. 
12 The coefficients reported in Table 4 reflect the increase/decrease in the log cause-specific hazards ratio. 
Therefore, we exponentiate the coefficients and then calculate the economic significance.  
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al. (2017) and replace our systematic tail risk derived from the augmented market model with MES. 
13 
  
A possible concern related to the interpretation of our findings is reverse causality; that is, an 
increase in the probability of a forced turnover might induce managers to increase idiosyncratic 
tail risk as an extreme attempt to boost value. While the use of the lagged values of bank tail risk 
in our empirical setting (to some extent) mitigates reverse causality, the existing literature does not 
generally show that an increasing risk of dismissal increases the risk appetite of CEOs. In fact, 
Chakraborty (2007) shows the contrasting result that corporate risk-taking increases when CEOs 
have a higher job security. Furthermore, in the Online Appendix, similarly to Chakraborty (2007), 
we first estimate the risk of a CEO dismissal via a survival model and then use it as an explanatory 
variable of bank idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk. In line with previous studies on non-financial 
firms, this additional test documents that an increase in CEO dismissal risk is not associated with 
increases in bank tail risk, including idiosyncratic tail risk.  
                                                 
13 The impact of idiosyncratic ES on forced CEO turnover does not appear to be related to the estimation method 
of idiosyncratic tail risk. Additional tests (available on request), show that this result holds when we include in the 
market model single-period and two-period lags of industry and market returns and when we account for non-
synchronous trading patterns using both leads and lags of industry and market returns (Dimson, 1979). In addition, 
the results remain similar if we use an alternative measure of idiosyncratic tail risk based on an approach that resembles 
the computation of MES and does not require the estimation of a market model .Essentially, we define idiosyncratic 
tail risk as a bank’s average return below the 5th percentile of the daily return distribution when the market returns 
are above the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution.  
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The above test, however, does not rule out another possible interpretation based on Weisbach 
(1988). He observes that stock returns incorporate the expectations that a CEO will be fired. 
Accordingly, the returns of a bank managed by a CEO that will be fired are higher than they would 
be otherwise. The anticipation effect embedded in stock returns also influences tail risk and 
volatility. In essence, when the market anticipates a forced turnover, a bank’s return distribution 
changes leading to tail risk and volatility being informative on CEO dismissal while stock returns 
are not (as in our analysis).  While in section 4.2, we show that our results remain valid when we 
employ an accounting based measure of tail risk that, as argued by Weisbach (1988), should be less 
affected by any anticipation effect, we acknowledge the difficulties in fully ruling out an 
interpretation based on this effect.  
Moving onto the analysis of the control variables, we find that numerous variables have a 
significant impact on the likelihood of a CEO turnover in large banks. Consistent with Bushman 
et al. (2010), we find that idiosyncratic volatility increases the likelihood of a forced turnover while 
it does not affect voluntary turnovers. Furthermore, CEOs at large banks are more likely to 
experience forced turnovers. Moreover, in most of the specifications, CEOs at banks with higher 
capital ratios are less likely to be fired or to voluntarily leave a bank while higher charter values 
(signaling more growth opportunities) tend to reduce the probability of CEO dismissal. The 
likelihood of a forced turnover, but not of a voluntary turnover, is also lower in banks with a 
higher profitability.  
In terms of bank governance, as in the literature on non-financial firms (Del Guercio et al., 
2008; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Helwege et al., 2012; Parrino et al., 2003), we find that an increase 
in CEO power reduces the likelihood of both forced and voluntary turnovers, while higher levels 
of institutional ownership are more (less) likely to lead to a CEO being fired (leaving voluntarily). 
As far as country controls are concerned, similarly to DeFond and Park (1999) and Goyal and Park 
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(2002) for non-financial firms, in most of the specifications we find that the likelihood of a forced 
turnover is negatively associated with the degree of banking market concentration. Finally, forced 
turnovers occur more frequently in more shareholder-oriented countries as indicated by higher 
values of the director liability index.  
In general, the results of this section suggest that idiosyncratic tail risk is a key determinant of 
the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover and offers incremental information as compared to what 
is contained in accounting and market measures of performance and, more importantly, in 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
4.2 Is the Idiosyncratic Tail Risk Effect Different from a Poor Idiosyncratic Performance Effect? 
A possible explanation for our finding still remains that our measures of idiosyncratic ES (based 
on extreme negative returns) are to some extent capturing an effect due to low idiosyncratic stock 
returns. We conduct a series of tests to further demonstrate that idiosyncratic tail risk has an effect 
on forced CEO turnover independently from realized idiosyncratic stock performance. 
Specifically, we start by focusing on a sub-sample of banks that excludes low idiosyncratic 
returns (based on the sample median) and re-estimate the competing risks hazard model for this 
sub-sample. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we still find that idiosyncratic tail risk is 
associated (at the 10% level) with a greater hazard of CEO dismissal, while systematic tail risk does 
not matter for CEO dismissals. Therefore, the impact of idiosyncratic tail risk on forced turnover 
is also observable when we exclude poorly performing banks.  
We next construct a sub-sample of banks that jointly exclude those institutions with 
(simultaneously) low idiosyncratic performance (below the sample median) and high idiosyncratic 
volatility (above the sample median) to control for the possibility that our finding above is 
motivated by a high volatility effect. Again, we still find that idiosyncratic tail risk is significant (at 
the 10% level) in our model. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
As a further robustness check, we repeat our analysis by using two alternative extreme risk 
measures that, as shown in the Online Appendix, have a much lower correlation with measures of 
realized idiosyncratic stock performance (and volatility).14 We start by following Bushman and 
Williams (2015) that employ Skewness as an alternative market-based measure of extreme risk. Next, 
we employ a risk measure focusing on extreme accounting returns (Accounting Downside Risk). This 
measure is computed as a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank’s ROA is below the 
5th percentile of the estimated earnings distribution that we assume follows a normal distribution 
and we build on the basis of a seven year rolling window of accounting returns starting from 2000. 
Consistent with our main analysis, we then compute the firm-specific (idiosyncratic) and non-firm-
specific (systematic) risk measures. We still find that the impact on forced CEO turnover is limited 
to the firm-specific component of tail risk. 15 
4.3 Alternative Model Specifications 
We conduct various additional tests to check the robustness of our key findings. We report the 
results of these additional tests in the Online Appendix. We first address the concern that our 
results may be sensitive to using a competing risks hazard model. We, therefore, estimate a 
multinomial logit model that is commonly employed by the prior literature on the determinants of 
                                                 
14 The Online Appendix also shows how we compute these measures, the related descriptive statistics and the 
correlation coefficients for idiosyncratic and systematic ES and these additional tail risk measures.  
15 The literature (see, for instance, Van Bekkum, 2016) often employs directly the negative value of the stock 
return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the distribution of daily stock returns (defined as a bank’s VaR ) as a 
measure of tail risk. In the Online Appendix, we show that our key results remain unchanged also when VaR is used 
as a tail risk measure. 
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executive turnovers (Huson et al., 2001). Second, we use a simple Cox hazard model whereby we 
focus only on forced CEO turnovers and treat all voluntary turnovers as censored observations, 
as in Brookman and Thistle (2009) and Jenter and Kannan (2015). The results of these tests 
confirm that our primary findings still hold.  
Next, we stipulate that a CEO should be in charge for at least two consecutive years before 
experiencing a turnover event. Hence, we exclude all observations where CEO turnovers took 
place less than two years after a new CEO was appointed. Again, we do not find any change in 
our findings.  
In our sample period numerous countries experienced a systemic crisis as identified by Laeven 
and Valencia (2013). It is often argued that CEO dismissals during crises may be a response by 
boards to increasing public vitriol and regulatory scrutiny into holding executives responsible for 
mismanagement.16 To control for the influence of systemic banking crises on our results, we 
include a dummy (Crisis) variable that takes the value of one for every year-country combination 
identifying a systemic banking crisis. Our primary findings remain similar as regards the positive 
impact of idiosyncratic tail risk on the likelihood of CEO dismissals.  
4.4 Does the Importance of Idiosyncratic Tail Risk on Forced Turnovers depend on the Banking Market 
Structure? 
Our results are consistent with the view that a bank board learns about the CEO’s decision 
making via the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk. A key implication deriving from such a result is 
                                                 
16 See for example, ‘Bank chiefs in the firing line’, The Independent, 30 Oct 2007; ‘Royal Bank of Scotland chiefs 
to be forced out under bailout deal’, The Telegraph, 8 Oct 2008; ‘5% Of Latest Bank Of America Bailout Used To 
Pay Merrill Lynch Bonuses (BAC)’, Business Insider, 22 Jan 2009; ‘US watchdog calls for bank executives to be 
sacked’, The Guardian, 5 April 2009.  
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that the importance assigned to idiosyncratic tail risk should depend on the market structure within 
which the bank operates. 
Specifically, previous studies on non-financial firms postulate that the importance assigned to 
signals related to CEO choices becomes lower when the industry concentration is higher (Brickley, 
2003; DeFond and Park, 1999; Goyal and Park, 2002) as the assessment of CEO decision making 
is better facilitated in competitive environments. Furthermore, more concentrated markets tend 
to be characterized by greater difficulties in replacing an incumbent CEO because of the lower 
number of peers in the external market for executives (Brickley, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 
2017). 
While the existing empirical evidence focuses on the interplay between performance and market 
structure, a similar argument should hold in the context of our analysis to the extent that 
idiosyncratic tail risk offers additional and valuable information to bank boards in the assessment 
of CEOs’ decisions. In this section, we test this conjecture by extending our baseline specification 
with interaction terms between idiosyncratic and systematic ES and our measure of banking 
market concentration.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results reported in Table 6 show that the coefficient of Idiosyncratic ES * Bank Concentration 
is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that in more concentrated banking markets, 
large banks are less likely to dismiss CEOs when idiosyncratic tail risk increases. The results also 
appear economically relevant: an increase in the degree of bank concentration from the lowest 
quartile (i.e. countries with low concentration) to the highest quartile (i.e. countries with high 
concentration) leads to a reduction in the sensitivity of forced turnovers to idiosyncratic tail risk 
by 54% for a one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic tail risk for model (1). Furthermore, 
as shown in the Online Appendix, we achieve a similar result when we employ the market share 
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in the deposit market of the top four largest banks in a given country as an alternative measure of 
banking market concentration. 
Overall, in line with the prior evidence that indicates concentration reduces the sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnovers to relative performance in non-financial firms (DeFond and Park, 1999; 
Goyal and Park, 2002), we show that in the case of the banking industry, market concentration 
also reduces the sensitivity of CEO dismissals to idiosyncratic tail risk. 
4.5 Which Bank Stakeholders Care More about Idiosyncratic Tail Risk? 
In this section we evaluate which bank stakeholders amplify the sensitivity of CEO turnovers 
to idiosyncratic tail risk. This is important to enriching our understanding of which types of 
stakeholders contribute to increasing the cost of idiosyncratic tail risk for bank CEOs. We look at 
the role played by bank uninsured creditors, inside shareholders, regulators and institutional 
investors. To capture the influence of uninsured creditors, we focus on subordinated debtholders 
since they are subject to a larger risk of suffering losses than other bank creditors and are a key 
source of discipline for bank executives (Ashcraft, 2008; Goyal, 2005; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
Insiders might have a lower tolerance for idiosyncratic tail risk since they have limited 
diversification opportunities (Gao, 2010). Consequently, a higher level of insider ownership might 
result in internalizing the costs of a bank default (Booth et al., 2002) and lead to a decline in the 
expected utility of pursuing risky policies (Faccio et al., 2011). In short, bank insiders might fear 
the costs associated with idiosyncratic tail risk more than other types of bank shareholders. 
Under the micro-prudential view of banking regulation, an effective regulatory regime should 
materialize via a larger sensitivity of CEO turnover to idiosyncratic tail risk when the degree of 
supervisory power increases. More controversial, is the possible role of institutional investors. 
While they might have better skills in monitoring bank management than other shareholders, the 
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fact that institutional investors usually hold diversified portfolios might reduce the importance 
assigned to idiosyncratic tail risk when assessing CEO performance.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
To conduct the empirical tests, we estimate models with interaction terms between the selected 
variables and tail risk measures. The results, reported in Table 7, offer evidence to support the 
view that some types of bank stakeholders might be more important than others in exercising 
discipline in terms of idiosyncratic tail risk. Specifically, an increase in the share of subordinated 
debt in a bank’s capital structure or in inside ownership amplifies the sensitivity of CEO turnover 
to idiosyncratic tail risk but this sensitivity does not vary with the strength of supervisory power 
or the importance of institutional shareholders.  
Overall, the results discussed in this section are not surprising when compared to US-based 
studies on non-financial firms (Del Guercio et al., 2008; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Kaplan et al., 
2012; Parrino et al., 2003). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the cross-country heterogeneity in 
bank governance structures in our sample should impose a note of caution when drawing 
conclusions from the reported findings.   
4.6 Do Bank Boards See Systematic Tail Risk as Fully Unrelated to CEO Choices? 
We next evaluate whether bank boards interpret systematic tail risk as simply being the 
manifestation of an exogenous event and as such unimportant for the firing decision. This 
additional analysis is motivated by a growing body of banking research showing that systematic 
tail risks are not necessarily exogenous to bank behavior (see, for instance, Acharya et al., 2010; 
Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006). 
Our approach is to test for the presence of variation in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover 
to systematic tail risk when there are changes in the consequences a bank can suffer from being 
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exposed to such risks. A variation in the sensitivity of forced turnover to systematic tail risks in 
the presence of these changes would suggest that boards perceive the exposure to systematic tail 
risk as being related, at least in part, to CEO choices.  
To conduct this additional analysis, we consider three different settings. The first two settings 
identify contexts where shareholders might see being exposed to systematic tail risk as more costly. 
We start by focusing on the period post 2010 when there was greater regulatory and policy 
attention to systemic matters related to large financial institutions However, it can be argued that 
the post 2010 environment also witnessed other broader economic changes that may result in a 
weaker identification. In an attempt to provide a more refined test, we next focus on the 
institutions in our sample included in the list of global systemically important financial institutions 
by the Financial Stability Board since 2010. For these institutions regulatory costs are closely 
related to systemic effects. The inclusion in this list is seen negatively by shareholders (see Bongini 
et al., 2015) and banks can be removed only when they do not pose a global systemic threat. 
Accordingly, our expectation is that if CEO choices are seen as influencing a bank’s exposure 
to systematic tail risk, we should observe an increase in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
systematic tail risk post-2010 and, more importantly, for banks that are identified as globally 
systemically important. To conduct our analysis, we first interact our measures of tail risk with a 
dummy equal to one for the years after 2010. Next, we repeat a similar test using a dummy (SIFI) 
equal to one for global systemically important financial institutions.  
In a third test, we use the cross-country variation in the adoption of blanket guarantees by 
governments on banks debts. Under a blanket guarantee, a government offers protection against 
a bank default to creditors that are not conventionally protected by deposit insurance. The purpose 
is to prevent negative externalities arising from correlated bank defaults (Laeven and Valencia, 
2012). Under a blanket guarantee, the mispricing of government guarantees is more pronounced 
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and banks have more possibilities to extract value from the financial safety net via their risk-taking. 
To extract value, however, banks have to avoid closure by regulators and, thereby, benefit from 
forbearance (Allen and Saunders, 1993; Ronn and Verma, 1986). This is more likely when banks 
increase their exposure to non-firm-specific risks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and 
Dinç, 2011). In the presence of a blanket guarantee, we should, therefore, observe a decrease in 
the sensitivity of a forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk if CEO choices can influence the 
exposure to this risk. To conduct this third test, we employ a dummy (Blanket Guarantee) that equals 
one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were insured.17 We then include 
this dummy and its interaction with the tail risk measures as additional explanatory variables in our 
models.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Panels A and B of Table 8 show the key findings of the first and the second tests, while Panel 
C reports the results of the third test. In general, the results of all tests do not support the view 
that bank boards see the exposure to systematic tail risk as being fully unrelated to CEO choices.18 
The interaction terms between our measures of systematic tail risk and the post 2010 or the SIFI 
                                                 
17 In our sample 15 countries used blanket guarantees. Data on blanket guarantees are from Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) and IADI (2005, 2008). We complement these data sources with data from national deposit insurance funds. 
There is considerable heterogeneity in terms of the time-period over which such guarantees were extended. For 
instance, various countries (e.g. Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey) extended blanket guarantees during 2004-05. 
Similarly, some countries (e.g. Australia, Hungary, and Portugal) extended the support beyond the 2007-2009 crisis to 
cover 2010 and 2011.  
18 The post-2010 coefficient is subsumed in year dummies and hence is not reported in the table. 
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dummy (the blanket guarantee dummy) are positive (negative) and statistically significant at 
customary levels.19  
In summary, the findings discussed in this section suggest that bank boards assign importance 
to systematic tail risk for forced CEO turnovers when there is a major variation in the costs that 
the exposure to this risk generates for shareholders and the bank.  
5. Conclusions  
Our analysis shows that the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover (but not of a voluntary 
turnover) is greater when large banks are characterized by an increasing exposure to idiosyncratic 
tail risk. Thus, large bank CEOs do seem to bear some costs of increasing the idiosyncratic tail 
risk of their banks. Furthermore, the influence of idiosyncratic tail risk is stronger in less 
concentrated banking industries and in the presence of stakeholders that have more to lose from 
an increase in this risk. In general, we document that idiosyncratic tail risk offers information to 
assess CEOs’ decision making that is different from what bank boards can infer from accounting 
and market measures of performance and idiosyncratic volatility.  
                                                 
19 An alternative explanation of our finding on blanket guarantees could be panic. Blanket guarantees are often 
associated with systemic crises where regulators might provide incentives to banks to retain CEOs to avoid 
exacerbating panic conditions in the system.  In the Online Appendix, we test this alternative explanation in two ways. 
First, we construct an alternative blanket guarantee dummy that takes a value equal to one only when the guarantee 
covers bank debt in non-systemic crisis periods. Second, we interact the idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk with the 
crisis dummy employed in Section 4.3 that should signal more panic stemming from the news of a CEO removal. The 
first test confirms a decline in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk. The second test does not 
show any impact of our proxy of bank panic on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to systematic tail risk. 
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Finally, we show that the lack of importance of systematic tail risk that we observe over the full 
sample period for CEO dismissal does not imply that bank boards consider this risk as always 
being the result of exogenous events that are completely independent from CEO choices.  Our 
analysis documents that how bank boards see the exposure to systematic tail risk, and the role of 
this risk in the firing decision, depends on the benefits and costs that such exposure might generate 
for the bank.  
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution. 
 Observations Banks 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Country 
Australia 40 2.01 5 1.92 
Austria 31 1.55 4 1.53 
Bahrain 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Belgium 22 1.10 3 1.15 
Brazil 17 0.85 2 0.77 
Canada 57 2.86 7 2.68 
Chile 14 0.70 2 0.77 
China 73 3.66 11 4.21 
Cyprus 7 0.35 1 0.38 
Czech Republic 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Denmark 25 1.25 3 1.15 
Finland 9 0.45 1 0.38 
France 34 1.71 4 1.53 
Germany 56 2.81 7 2.68 
Greece 49 2.46 6 2.30 
Hong Kong 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Hungary 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Iceland 2 0.10 1 0.38 
India 56 2.81 8 3.07 
Indonesia 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Ireland 23 1.15 3 1.15 
Israel 31 1.55 4 1.53 
Italy 53 2.66 6 2.30 
Japan 334 16.75 47 18.01 
Jordan 7 0.35 1 0.38 
Korea 39 1.96 6 2.30 
Luxembourg 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Malaysia 53 2.66 6 2.30 
Mexico 18 0.90 2 0.77 
Netherlands 18 1.00 3 1.15 
Norway 20 0.45 1 0.38 
Poland 17 0.85 2 0.77 
Portugal 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Russia 6 0.30 1 0.38 
Saudi Arabia 26 1.30 5 1.92 
Singapore 27 1.35 3 1.15 
South Africa 44 2.21 5 1.92 
Spain 48 2.41 6 2.30 
Sweden 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Switzerland 30 1.50 4 1.53 
Taiwan 85 4.26 12 4.60 
Thailand 51 2.56 6 2.30 
Turkey 34 1.71 5 1.92 
UAE 9 0.45 1 0.38 
United Kingdom 59 2.96 8 3.07 
United States 335 16.80 43 16.48 
Total  1994 100% 261 100% 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year  
Year Observations Turnovers Forced Turnovers 
  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2005 186 24 8.82 7 9.46 
2006 207 22 8.09 4 5.40 
2007 220 27 9.93 6 8.11 
2008 236 28 10.29 13 17.57 
2009 239 44 16.18 11 14.86 
2010 241 35 12.87 7 9.46 
2011 228 25 9.19 4 5.41 
2012 216 29 10.66 10 13.51 
2013 221 38 13.97 12 16.22 
Total 1994 272 100% 74 100% 
This Table presents the distribution of our sample of 261 banks across 46 countries from 2005-2013. Panel A presents the sample by country and Panel B by year.  
  
39 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix: Tail Risk, Return and Volatility Measures. 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev.  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (4) – (1) (5) – (2)   (7) (8) (9) (7) – (1) (8) – (2) 
Panel A:  Tail Risk Measures                    
Idiosyncratic ES 1722 2.062 2.185 0.616  74 2.253 2.463 0.576 2.775*** 2.877***  198 2.107 2.309 0.630 0.942 1.092 
Systematic ES 1722 2.944 3.060 1.006  74 3.503 3.928 0.842 5.545*** 5.033***  198 3.018 3.267 1.013 0.974 0.983 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 1722 3.576 3.002 2.229  74 4.790 4.040 2.471 4.124*** 4.434***  198 3.835 3.199 2.591 1.349 0.478 
Panel B: Return and Volatility Measures                   
Idiosyncratic Returns 1722 -0.045 -0.039 0.166  74 -0.106 -0.089 0.202 -2.594** -2.590**  198 -0.053 -0.053 0.166 -0.648 -0.755 
Systematic Returns 1722 0.135 0.130 0.315  74 0.061 0.079 0.350 -1.775* -1.559  198 0.111 0.129 0.333 -0.948 -0.761 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 1722 0.205 0.189 0.091  74 0.245 0.224 0.104 3.272*** 3.295***  198 0.211 0.208 0.095 0.904 0.991 
Systematic Volatility 1722 0.256 0.234 0.106  74 0.294 0.276 0.111 2.864*** 2.996***  198 0.266 0.244 0.111 1.198 1.088 
 
Panel C: Correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Idiosyncratic ES 1 0.405 0.422 0.894 0.489 -0.315 -0.167 
(2) Systematic ES 0.350 1 0.960 0.414 0.834 -0.048 -0.324 
(3) MES 0.374 0.963 1 0.427 0.825 -0.073 -0.316 
(4) Idiosyncratic Return -0.337 -0.086 -0.091 1 -0.172 -0.353 -0.117 
(5) Systematic Return -0.110 -0.366 -0.353 -0.199 1 -0.177 -0.301 
(6) Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.805 0.522 0.503 -0.415 -0.166 1 0.587 
(7) Systematic Volatility 0.434 0.815 0.830 -0.140 -0.297 0.616 1 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of tail risk measures while Panel B shows summary statistics for return and volatility.  All variables are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. Panel C provides Spearman (above) and Pearson (below) correlations between the risk 
and return measures. We represent descriptive statistics for our original sample consisting of 1994 observations. The t-statistics provided here are obtained using tests of differences in means and the z-statistics correspond to the tests of differences in medians using the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics: Bank Fundamentals, Governance and Country Characteristics. 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev.  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (4) – (1) (5) – (2)   (7) (8) (9) (7) – (1) (8) – (2) 
Panel A: Bank Fundamentals                   
Profitability 1722 -0.110 -0.004 0.782  74 -0.505 -0.458 0.902 -3.708*** -4.182***  198 -0.203 -0.104 0.820 -1.519 -1.730* 
Industry Profitability  1722 0.009 0.009 0.009  74 0.009 0.006 0.009 -0.690 -0.541  198 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.652 0.603 
Bank Size 1722 18.362 18.070 1.286  74 19.131 19.056 1.503 4.335*** 4.390***  198 18.342 18.136 1.162 -0.222 0.327 
Bank Capital 1722 7.117 6.547 2.625  72 5.912 5.609 2.510 -3.984*** -3.988***  198 7.000 6.193 2.679 -0.587 -0.825 
Charter Value 1722 1.026 1.013 0.055  74 1.004 1.002 0.035 -5.056*** -2.984***  198 1.024 1.010 0.056 -0.301 -0.645 
Panel B: Governance Characteristics                   
Board Size 1722 2.537 2.565 0.334  74 2.550 2.565 0.384 0.296 0.549  198 2.529 2.565 0.316 -0.331 -0.179 
Independent Directors 1722 0.477 0.500 0.293  74 0.564 0.542 0.225 3.204*** 2.401**  198 0.462 0.500 0.277 -0.706 -0.784 
CEO Power 1719 1.119 1.000 0.635  74 0.851 1.000 0.589 -3.815*** -3.557***  197 1.030 1.000 0.614 -1.916* -1.901* 
Insider Ownership 1581 30.162 22.995 27.688  68 33.001 28.414 31.754 0.725 0.107  186 36.816 30.095 29.014 2.972*** 3.022*** 
Risk Governance 1722 1.447 2.000 0.732  74 1.676 2.000 0.552 3.444*** 2.496**  198 1.460 2.000 0.717 0.241 0.144 
Supervisory Power 1672 11.175 12.000 1.873  73 10.712 11.000 2.038 -1.906* -1.882*  192 11.172 12.000 1.696 -0.025 -0.726 
Institutional Ownership 1660 31.256 24.880 23.010  69 33.027 28.930 22.790 0.631 0.737  191 26.653 20.540 22.199 -2.703*** -2.890*** 
Panel C: Country Characteristics                   
Bank Concentration 1722 -2.582 -2.717 0.702  74 -2.466 -2.436 0.741 1.321 1.307  198 -2.540 -2.715 0.658 0.852 1.000 
Director Liability Index 1722 6.020 6.000 2.268  74 5.838 5.000 2.021 -0.754 -0.885  198 5.682 6.000 2.141 -2.090** -2.018** 
Activity Restrictions 1722 11.904 13.000 3.302  74 11.095 11.000 3.150 -2.160** -2.882**  198 11.965 13.000 3.304 0.243 0.293 
Development 1722 35.153 35.455 19.732  74 37.622 44.195 20.851 0.999 1.093  198 31.552 34.973 19.441 -2.464** -2.257** 
Fiscal Capacity 1722 -3.720 -3.586 4.058  74 -3.600 -3.021 3.870 0.260 0.607  198 -3.997 -3.618 4.159 -0.890 -0.599 
Size of Economy 1722 14.264 14.348 1.572  74 13.985 13.974 1.338 -1.743* -1.764*  198 14.137 14.073 1.518 -1.110 -0.946 
Inflation 1722 2.454 2.200 2.384  74 2.954 2.650 2.392 1.762* 2.240**  198 2.722 2.300 2.775 1.304 0.765 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics of all other variables which have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics provided here are obtained using tests of differences in means and the z-statistics correspond to the tests of differences in medians 
using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 4 
CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Idiosyncratic and Systematic ES. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.785*** 0.080 0.684** -0.133 0.688** -0.173 
 (2.915) (0.286) (2.408) (-0.376) (2.148) (-0.470) 
Systematic ES 0.029 0.101 0.019 0.099   
 (0.263) (1.548) (0.129) (1.145)   
MES     -0.025 0.071 
     (-0.167) (0.795) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 0.695 0.257 -0.570 0.797 -0.555 0.860 
 (0.565) (0.229) (-0.372) (0.661) (-0.368) (0.718) 
Systematic Returns -0.622 0.107 -0.881 0.271 -0.898* 0.221 
 (-1.458) (0.428) (-1.541) (0.800) (-1.720) (0.699) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 6.008*** -1.340 5.087** -0.365 5.318** 0.083 
 (3.327) (-0.581) (1.960) (-0.142) (2.101) (0.031) 
Systematic Volatility -1.287 -4.191** -0.731 -3.316 0.024 -2.728 
 (-0.428) (-2.239) (-0.192) (-1.284) (0.006) (-1.132) 
Profitability -0.725*** -0.210 -0.534*** -0.193 -0.537*** -0.203 
 (-3.076) (-1.288) (-2.947) (-0.983) (-3.052) (-1.013) 
Industry Profitability -0.431** -0.044 -0.292* -0.018 -0.293* -0.026 
 (-2.522) (-0.216) (-1.662) (-0.074) (-1.691) (-0.108) 
Bank Size 0.760*** 0.022 0.571*** 0.105 0.580*** 0.118 
 (4.846) (0.150) (5.277) (0.785) (4.842) (0.880) 
Bank Size2 0.089 -0.080* 0.144** -0.125*** 0.146** -0.124*** 
 (1.182) (-1.744) (2.254) (-2.937) (2.308) (-2.890) 
Bank Capital -0.111 -0.099* -0.158** -0.101* -0.157** -0.098 
 (-1.538) (-1.770) (-2.072) (-1.666) (-2.034) (-1.625) 
Charter Value -5.111 0.866 -5.131* -1.185 -5.264* -1.334 
 (-1.613) (0.295) (-1.829) (-0.374) (-1.814) (-0.412) 
Board Size   -0.498 -0.573* -0.507 -0.586* 
   (-1.628) (-1.757) (-1.583) (-1.798) 
Independent Directors   0.794 0.697 0.834 0.695 
   (0.824) (1.081) (0.829) (1.077) 
CEO Power   -0.785*** -0.590** -0.788*** -0.591** 
   (-4.257) (-2.316) (-4.265) (-2.333) 
Insider Ownership   0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
   (0.999) (1.224) (0.927) (1.202) 
Risk Governance   -0.288 -0.006 -0.282 0.004 
   (-1.301) (-0.043) (-1.298) (0.024) 
Supervisory Power   0.103 0.075 0.101 0.075 
   (0.879) (1.089) (0.877) (1.084) 
Institutional Ownership   0.012** -0.014** 0.012*** -0.013* 
   (2.430) (-1.971) (2.582) (-1.937) 
Bank Concentration -0.392 0.024 -0.585* -0.120 -0.602* -0.132 
 (-1.306) (0.111) (-1.741) (-0.539) (-1.878) (-0.576) 
Director Liability Index 0.188*** -0.111** 0.183** -0.048 0.186** -0.043 
 (3.328) (-2.509) (2.134) (-0.978) (2.207) (-0.869) 
Activity Restrictions 0.075 -0.016 0.040 -0.001 0.040 0.001 
 (1.595) (-0.496) (0.821) (-0.010) (0.855) (0.013) 
Development 0.004 -0.018** 0.005 -0.025** 0.005 -0.024** 
 (0.335) (-2.014) (0.392) (-2.291) (0.463) (-2.243) 
Fiscal Capacity 0.002 -0.058 -0.010 -0.073 -0.012 -0.073 
 (0.053) (-1.597) (-0.242) (-1.278) (-0.292) (-1.269) 
Size of Economy -0.692*** 0.064 -0.754*** 0.165 -0.772*** 0.145 
 (-4.230) (0.603) (-3.724) (1.324) (-4.444) (1.135) 
Inflation 0.217*** 0.014 0.214*** -0.036 0.213*** -0.031 
 (3.609) (0.164) (3.101) (-0.469) (3.032) (-0.393) 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -420.1 -1257 -343.8 -1045 -343.8 -1045 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO’s 
turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases the hazard rate for a CEO 
to be replaced and hence shortens the expected tenure. Idiosyncratic ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of residual returns from the market model and the systematic 
ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of predicted returns from the market model, as specified in equation (2). In Model (3), the systematic risk measure is replaced by 
Acharya et al.’s (2017) Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) which is another measure of aggregate system-wide risk. For consistency, the systematic and idiosyncratic returns have 
also been estimated following Jenter and Kannan (2015). All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and 
are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 5 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Is it Poor Performance? 
 
Excluding Low Returns Excluding Low Returns + High Volatility  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.347* 1.232* 1.214* 1.197* 
 (1.797) (1.641) (1.736) (1.743) 
Systematic ES 0.076  0.031  
 (0.279)  (0.123)  
MES  -0.074  -0.097 
  (-0.256)  (-0.392) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 2.244 2.973 3.013 2.878 
 (0.294) (0.399) (0.512) (0.539) 
Systematic Returns -0.638 -0.674 -0.363 -0.376 
 (-0.624) (-0.574) (-0.383) (-0.394) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 2.748 5.063 6.473 7.479 
 (0.441) (0.867) (1.109) (1.567) 
Systematic Volatility 10.399 12.788 7.659 9.814 
 (1.236) (1.587) (1.094) (1.556) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 872 872 1,143 1,143 
Log-likelihood -123.3 -124 -145.3 -145.2 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk 
measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. We divide the sample into observations with high (above median) and low (below median) idiosyncratic 
returns and for brevity show results for the forced turnover sample. A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases the hazard rate for a CEO to be replaced and hence 
shortens the expected tenure. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on standard errors 
clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Table 6 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Impact of Bank Market Concentration. 
 (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.054*** 1.068*** 
 (3.080) (2.765) 
Systematic ES 0.017  
 (0.108) -0.038 
MES  (-0.224) 
   
Idiosyncratic ES * Bank Concentration -1.112** -1.080** 
 (-2.408) (-2.194) 
Systematic ES * Bank Concentration 0.084  
 (1.210)  
MES * Bank Concentration  0.097 
  (0.880) 
Bank Concentration -0.752** -0.763** 
 (-2.521) (-2.371) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.484 -0.405 
 (-0.323) (-0.274) 
Systematic Returns -0.951 -0.955* 
 (-1.638) (-1.864) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.458* 4.779** 
 (1.784) (2.136) 
Systematic Volatility -0.619 0.358 
 (-0.162) (0.088) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -339.4 -339.8 
This Table estimates competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the 
CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Bank Concentration is measured as the log of the Herfindahl index of bank deposits in each country. A positive 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been 
defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 7 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Which Bank Stakeholders Care More About Tail Risks?  
Panel A: Impact of Subordinated Debt Discipline (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.692** 0.634* 
 (2.197) (1.776) 
Systematic ES 0.087  
 (0.656)  
MES  0.049 
  (0.337) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Subordinated Debt 0.588* 0.667** 
 (1.799) (1.971) 
Systematic ES * Subordinated Debt 0.021  
 (0.385)  
MES * Subordinated Debt  -0.021 
  (-0.282) 
Subordinated Debt -1.413 0.484 
 (-0.084) (0.030) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.654 -0.705 
 (-0.378) (-0.408) 
Systematic Returns -1.199** -1.181** 
 (-2.201) (-2.267) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.145* 6.337** 
 (1.780) (2.228) 
Systematic Volatility -1.365 -1.316 
 (-0.447) (-0.404) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,449 1,449 
Log-likelihood -318 -318.4 
Panel B: Impact of Insider Ownership   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.852*** 0.786** 
 (2.723) (2.412) 
Systematic ES 0.051  
 (0.322)  
MES  -0.029 
  (-0.196) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Insider Ownership 0.020* 0.018* 
 (1.746) (1.677) 
Systematic ES * Insider Ownership 0.001  
 (0.756)  
MES * Insider Ownership  0.003 
  (1.495) 
Insider Ownership 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.727) (-0.645) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -1.352 -1.730 
 (-0.847) (-1.147) 
Systematic Returns -0.862 -0.729 
 (-1.456) (-1.373) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.490* 6.616** 
 (1.910) (2.516) 
Systematic Volatility -1.606 -0.617 
 (-0.380) (-0.164) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -343.1 -341.2 
Panel C: Impact of Supervisory Power   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.693* 0.658* 
 (1.858) (1.672) 
Systematic ES 0.075  
 (0.485)  
MES  0.036 
  (0.256) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Supervisory Power -0.073 -0.079 
 (-0.356) (-0.376) 
Systematic ES * Supervisory Power 0.035  
 (1.518)  
MES * Supervisory Power  0.047* 
  (1.706) 
Supervisory Power 0.066 0.063 
 (0.563) (0.509) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.585 -0.570 
 (-0.356) (-0.360) 
Systematic Returns -0.962 -0.951* 
 (-1.577) (-1.709) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.498** 5.969** 
 (2.047) (2.208) 
Systematic Volatility -2.237 -1.775 
 (-0.527) (-0.457) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -344.9 -343.5 
[Table continued]   
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[Table continued]   
Panel D: Impact of Institutional Ownership   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.637** 0.673** 
 (2.122) (1.967) 
Systematic ES 0.012  
 (0.082)  
MES  -0.030 
  (-0.197) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Institutional Ownership 0.003 0.003 
 (0.262) (0.239) 
Systematic ES * Institutional Ownership -0.002  
 (-1.275)  
MES * Institutional Ownership  -0.003 
  (-1.289) 
Institutional Ownership 0.014** 0.014** 
 (2.444) (2.393) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.708 -0.579 
 (-0.455) (-0.374) 
Systematic Returns -0.828 -0.830 
 (-1.326) (-1.485) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.830** 5.788** 
 (2.236) (2.310) 
Systematic Volatility -1.081 -0.215 
 (-0.269) (-0.054) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -344.1 -344.3 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk 
measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of 
CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. For brevity, only relevant covariates are 
shown in each Panel. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 8 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Is Systematic Tail Risk Exogenous? 
Panel A: Shift towards a Macro-Prudential Framework (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.184*** 1.180*** 
 (2.719) (2.612) 
Systematic ES 0.016  
 (0.089)  
MES  -0.030 
  (-0.200) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Post-2010 -0.776 -0.770 
 (-1.634) (-1.641) 
Systematic ES * Post-2010 0.201*  
 (1.768)  
MES * Post-2010  0.210* 
  (1.860) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.899 -0.676 
 (-0.594) (-0.266) 
Systematic Returns -0.840 -0.825 
 (-1.421) (-1.609) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.775* 5.013* 
 (1.662) (1.701) 
Systematic Volatility -2.537 -1.722 
 (-0.543) (-0.405) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -345.7 -345.8 
Panel B: Impact of SIFI   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.899** 0.910** 
 (2.211) (2.044) 
Systematic ES 0.030  
 (0.172)  
MES  -0.061 
  (-0.366) 
Idiosyncratic ES * SIFI -1.869 -1.605 
 (-1.620) (-1.627) 
Systematic ES * SIFI 0.312*  
 (1.960)  
MES * SIFI  0.484*** 
  (3.237) 
SIFI -0.512 -0.643 
 (-0.523) (-0.772) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.603 -0.639 
 (-0.345) (-0.366) 
Systematic Returns -0.889 -0.955** 
 (-1.638) (-1.986) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -2.599 -1.069 
 (-0.524) (-0.236) 
Systematic Volatility 5.512* 6.010** 
 (1.923) (2.056) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -344.6 -343.8 
Panel C: Impact of Blanket Guarantee   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.533* 0.611* 
 (1.832) (1.788) 
Systematic ES 0.038  
 (0.353)  
MES  0.071 
  (0.397) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Blanket Guarantee 4.674 5.365 
 (1.434) (1.335) 
Systematic ES * Blanket Guarantee -0.236*  
 (-1.686)  
MES * Blanket Guarantee  -0.370** 
  (-2.560) 
Blanket Guarantee -1.489 -1.601 
 (-0.752) (-0.659) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -1.130 -0.971 
 (-0.713) (-0.522) 
Systematic Returns -0.755 -0.872** 
 (-1.433) (-2.017) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.131* 5.021* 
 (1.711) (1.726) 
Systematic Volatility -1.516 -1.810 
 (-0.447) (-0.407) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -340.2 -342.5 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk 
measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Panel A uses a Post-2010 dummy that equals one for the post-2010 period and zero otherwise. Panel 
B uses SIFI as an indicator variable that equals one for banks that are systemically important financial institutions. Panel C uses Blanket Guarantee as an indicator variable that equals 
one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were insured. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of 
CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis 
and are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. Econometric Methodology 
We adopt the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model that estimates the time to occurrence of a turnover event. 
The hazard model takes into account the occurrence of a turnover (forced or voluntary) and the time at which this 
event occurs.20 The dependent variable in our hazard model is the CEO’s tenure and the corresponding hazard 
function is given by: 
  ℎ𝑖(𝑡, 𝑋) =  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑑𝑡→ 0
𝑃(𝑡<𝑇<𝑡+𝑑𝑡 | 𝑇>𝑡,𝑋)
𝑑𝑡
     (A.1) 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡, 𝑋) =  ℎ0(𝑡) exp (𝑋𝑖,𝑗 )     (A.2) 
where equation (A.1) shows that the hazard function ℎ𝑖(𝑡, 𝑋) represents the instantaneous risk that a specific 
CEO turnover event will occur, conditional on the fact that the CEO has thus far remained with the firm. Equation 
(A.2) represents the commonly-used exponential functional form of the hazard function, where ℎ0(𝑡) represents a 
common baseline hazard for all subjects in our sample, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  represents the vector of covariates. Furthermore, our 
econometric framework takes into account that each CEO can be thought of being at some risk of exit, either through 
dismissal or voluntarily leaving the current position, throughout his/her tenure and this risk can be expressed through 
the following cause-specific hazard rate: 
ℎ𝑟,𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ𝑟,0(𝑡) 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑟,𝑖 , 𝐵𝐹𝑟,𝑖 , 𝐼𝐷𝑟,𝑖 ,𝐸𝐷𝑟,𝑖 ,𝐶𝐶𝑟,𝑖 )   (A.3) 
where r represents the type of competing risk (forced or voluntary); ℎ𝑟,𝑖(𝑡) represents the cause-specific underlying 
hazard estimated simultaneously for both competing risks; Risk is the key explanatory variable, BF is a vector of bank 
fundamentals, ID is a vector of variables capturing internal discipline mechanisms, ED is a vector of variables 
capturing external discipline mechanisms, CC is a vector of country controls. Note that we allow for the point-estimate 
                                                 
20 A large number of prior studies have employed static models (e.g. probit and logit) to assess the determinants 
of CEO turnovers (e.g. Bushman et al., 2010; Huson et al., 2001; Parrino, 1997; Schaeck et al., 2011). However, using 
a hazard model over such traditional techniques offers advantages (Brookman and Thistle, 2009; Hazarika et al., 2012). 
For instance, static models simply estimate the probability of an event occurring at some point during the examination 
period, whereas hazard models explicitly take into account the period over which a CEO is at risk and when the 
turnover event will occur. Put simply, Cox proportional hazard models account for the probability of turnover, 
conditional on the fact that the CEO has thus far remained with the firm and hence the time-to-occurrence of the 
event is informative about the risk of termination. Another advantage of the Cox proportional model is that it explicitly 
accounts for right-censoring of our data, thereby taking into account that the CEOs in our sample will eventually exit 
even if we do not observe this during our examination period. By contrast, the generic assumption of static models is 
that all CEOs at end of the sample period will never be fired or leave the firm.  
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of covariates to be different for each exit event. A positive coefficient on our covariates implies an increase in the 
cause-specific risk of a turnover. 
The choice of this method is motivated by the fact that, ex ante, there is no reason to believe that the underlying 
data generating processes for forced and voluntary turnovers follow the same underlying hazard rate. In contrast, 
there are strong reasons to expect that the underlying causal process for each competing event is different. For 
instance, firm performance may play a different role in explaining the likelihood of CEO turnovers. A CEO is more 
likely to be dismissed when performance is poor (e.g. high firm risk and poor returns) (Bushman et al., 2010; Huson 
et al., 2001; Parrino, 1997). Similarly, Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) also argue that the likelihood of dismissal decreases 
as a CEO becomes more entrenched within the firm, although the likelihood of retirement increases mechanically.  
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A2. Additional Tables  
 
 
Table A1 
Variable Definitions. 
Variable Definition 
Idiosyncratic ES Average residual returns below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) using the specified market model in equation (2), multiplied 
by -1. 
Systematic ES Average predicted returns below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) using the specified market model in equation (2), multiplied 
by -1. 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) Average bank returns corresponding to the bottom 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) of the aggregate banking sector in each 
country. 
Idiosyncratic Returns % Annualized daily values of residual stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at yearly intervals. 
Systematic Returns % Annualized daily values of predicted stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at yearly intervals.  
Idiosyncratic Volatility Standard deviation of residual stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at yearly intervals.  
Systematic Volatility Standard deviation of predicted stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at yearly intervals.  
Profitability ROA – mean ROA of the banking industry, expressed in percentages. 
Industry Profitability Mean ROA of the banking industry, expressed in percentages. 
Bank Size Natural log of total assets. 
Bank Capital Book value of Equity/Book value of Assets, expressed in percentages.  
Charter Value Market value of Assets/Book value of Assets, where market value is the sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities 
Board Size Natural log of the number of board members. 
Independent Directors % of independent directors on the board. 
CEO Power Yearly index computed as the sum of two indicator variables: CEO also serves as the Chairman and presence of an internal CEO. Yes = 
1 and No = 0. 
Insider Ownership % of shares owned by insiders, excluding the CEO, in the bank, as defined by S&P Capital IQ. 
Risk Governance Yearly index computed as the sum of two indicator variables: presence of a Chief Risk Officer and presence of Risk Committee. Yes = 1 
and No = 0. 
Bank Concentration Natural log of Herfindahl Index for bank deposits in each country. 
Supervisory Power Extent of supervisory power to correct problems. As used in Barth et al. (2004) and constructed from the World Bank Survey of Bank 
Regulation and Supervision. 
Institutional Ownership % of shares owned by institutional investors, as defined by S&P Capital IQ. 
Crisis Indicator variable that equals one for each country-year combination that had a systemic banking crisis. 
Post-2010 Indicator variable that equals one for the post-2010 period, and zero otherwise. 
SIFI  Indicator variable that equals one for banks present in the list of global systemically important financial institutions by the Financial Stability 
Board post 2010 
Blanket Guarantee Indicator variable that equals one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were insured. 
Director Liability Index Extent of director liability that measures the ability of minority shareholders to hold directors liable for inappropriate firm behavior as 
reported in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. 
Activity Restrictions Extent of regulatory restrictions placed on bank activities. As used in Barth et al. (2004) and constructed from the World Bank Survey of 
Bank Regulation and Supervision. 
Development GDP per capita (million US$). 
Fiscal Capacity  Government revenues minus expenditures scaled by GDP.  
Size of Economy Natural log of GDP (million US$). 
Inflation % inflation rate. 
This Table shows variable definitions. Risk measures and country characteristics are measured at the calendar year-end and bank financials and governance characteristics are 
measured at the fiscal year-end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
50 
Online Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Reverse Causality  
2. Alternative Measures of Tail risk 
3. Alternative Econometric Methods 
4. Alternative Measures of Banking Market Concentration  
5. Minimum CEO Tenure and Crisis Effect 
6. Alternative Explanations of the Blanket Guarantee Effect 
  
  
51 
 
 
 
Reverse Causality 
 
 
 
Table C1 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Reverse Causality? 
 Idiosyncratic ES Systematic ES MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CEO Dismissal Risk 0.006 -0.001 -0.008 
 (1.602) (-1.028) (-1.582) 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 1,689 1,689 1,688 
R-squared 0.834 0.525 0.605 
This Table reports the estimates from fixed effects regression that examine the impact of CEO dismissal risk on idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk. CEO dismissal risk is the 
predicted risk of termination for the CEO, obtained from a survival regression specified in column (2) of Table 4, after excluding risk controls. Idiosyncratic ES is the expected 
return below the 5th percentile of residual returns from the market model and the systematic ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of predicted returns from the market 
model, as specified in equation (2). In Model (3), the systematic risk measure is replaced by Acharya et al.’s (2017) Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) which is another measure of 
aggregate system-wide risk. For consistency, the systematic and idiosyncratic returns have also been estimated following Jenter and Kannan (2015). All other variables have been 
defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include bank and year dummies. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on standard errors clustered at 
the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Alternative Measures of Tail Risk 
 
Table C2 
Robustness Test: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Measures of Tail Risk.  
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Idiosyncratic VaR 1.713 1.669 0.697  1.937 1.999 0.723  1.762 1.810 0.709 
Systematic VaR 2.492 2.328 1.109  3.135 3.388 1.035  2.568 2.507 1.120 
Idiosyncratic Skewness 0.030 0.042 0.126  0.048 0.049 0.077  0.014 0.040 0.171 
Systematic Skewness -0.020 -0.010 0.110  -0.018 -0.015 0.148  -0.009 -0.008 0.118 
Idiosyncratic Accounting Downside Risk 0.091 0.000 0.288  0.292 0.000 0.458  0.086 0.000 0.281 
Systematic Accounting Downside Risk 0.042 0.000 0.200  0.077 0.000 0.269  0.034 0.000 0.183 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics of the data for alternative market-based measures (VaR and Skewness) and accounting-based measure (Accounting Downside Risk) of 
tail risk. For ease of comparability, we represent descriptive statistics for our most conservative sample used in the main analyses consisting of No-turnover sample (n=1722, n=1722, 
n=1484), Forced turnover sample (n=74, n=74, n=65), and Voluntary turnover sample (n=198, n=198, n=174) for VaR, Skewness, and Downside Risk, respectively. VaR is 
measured as the daily bank return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the realized return distribution. Idiosyncratic VaR is the idiosyncratic return corresponding to the 5th 
percentile of the residuals from the market model while the Systematic VaR is the return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the predicted return from the market model. Skewness 
is defined as [(VaR50% - VaR5%) – (VaR95% - VaR50%)]/(VaR95% - VaR5%)) multiplied by minus 1, following Bushman et al. (2015). We compute the idiosyncratic and systematic 
Skewness using the idiosyncratic and systematic VaR estimates. We multiply each of these measures by minus one to keep the interpretation of the results consistent with our 
previous discussion; namely, higher values of each measure of Skewness indicate higher tail risk. Accounting Downside Risk is measured using a dummy variable that equals one if 
the ROA of the bank is worse than 1.645 standard deviations below the mean (corresponding to the 5th percentile). The idiosyncratic (or unconditional firm-specific) component of 
Accounting Downside Risk is a dummy variable that equals one if bank ROA is less than the 5th percentile but industry ROA is more than the 5th percentile. Similarly, the systematic 
(or conditional system-wide) component of Accounting Downside Risk is a dummy variable that equals one if bank ROA is less than the 5th percentile and industry ROA is less than 
the 5th percentile. There are 218 crash events, representing 14.7% of our sample, over our sample period and the distribution of crash events over our sample period is comparable 
to Cohen et al.’s (2014) study. Mean ROA and standard deviation of ROA use rolling 7-year windows. 
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Table C3 
Correlation of Alternative Tail Risk Measures with Volatility. 
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Risk components (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VaR 1 0.146 0.076 0.924 
Skewness 0.267 1 0.039 0.224 
Accounting Downside Risk 0.076 0.022 1 0.098 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.886 0.225 0.103 1 
Panel B: Systematic Risk components     
VaR 1 0.223 0.270 0.834 
Skewness 0.279 1 0.147 0.207 
Accounting Downside Risk 0.266 0.083 1 0.319 
Systematic Volatility 0.819 0.179 0.373 1 
This Table presents the Spearman (above) and Pearson (below) correlation between various tail risk measures over a more restrictive sample of 1714 observations.  
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Table C9 
CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Alternative Measures of Tail Risk 
 VaR  Skewness  Accounting Downside Risk 
 (1)  (3)  (4) 
 Forced Voluntary  Forced Voluntary  Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic Tail Risk 0.770* -0.258  5.326*** -2.030  0.644** -0.447 
 (1.951) (-0.725)  (3.409) (-1.453)  (2.339) (-1.560) 
Systematic Tail Risk 0.241 0.094  -0.774 0.945  -0.116 -0.353 
 (0.826) (0.461)  (-0.436) (0.727)  (-0.210) (-0.504) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.326 0.972  1.474 0.367  -1.149 1.528 
 (-0.205) (0.923)  (0.906) (0.358)  (-0.820) (1.112) 
Systematic Returns -0.792 0.182  -1.211** 0.366  -0.544 0.112 
 (-1.449) (0.593)  (-2.059) (1.194)  (-1.109) (0.396) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  5.233* 1.608  8.772*** -0.060  7.650*** -0.231 
 (1.663) (0.527)  (3.856) (-0.036)  (3.822) (-0.133) 
Systematic Volatility -2.565 -2.728  -1.988 -1.868  0.793 -1.141 
 (-0.733) (-0.944)  (-1.085) (-1.118)  (0.406) (-0.500) 
Other Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722  1,722 1,722  1,481 1,481 
Log-likelihood -346.4 -1046  -341.8 -1043  -318 -882.1 
This Table estimates competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO ’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. A positive coefficient 
on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on 
standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Alternative Econometric Methods 
 
 
Table C10 
CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Alternative Econometric Methods.  
 Multinomial Logit  Cox Proportional Hazards 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary  Forced Forced 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.578* -0.129 0.616* -0.188  0.673** 0.689** 
 (1.719) (-0.538) (1.683) (-0.767)  (2.365) (2.140) 
Systematic ES 0.049 0.083    0.049  
 (0.633) (1.484)    (0.295)  
MES   0.045 0.089   -0.014 
   (0.428) (1.227)   (-0.094) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 1.209 1.816 1.504 1.537  -0.811 -0.879 
 (0.795) (1.279) (0.578) (0.905)  (-0.517) (-0.568) 
Systematic Returns -0.692 0.098 -0.756 0.014  -0.908 -0.867 
 (-1.301) (0.343) (-1.454) (0.049)  (-1.399) (-1.559) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.175* 0.120 5.409* 0.643  5.197* 5.159* 
 (1.742) (0.064) (1.735) (0.344)  (1.749) (1.859) 
Systematic Volatility -2.219 -3.400* -1.932 -3.485*  -1.858 -0.884 
 (-0.729) (-1.789) (-0.558) (-1.672)  (-0.412) (-0.220) 
Other Controls YES YES  YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722  1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -745.4 -746.1  -335.5 -334.9 
This table reports the estimates from alternative econometric methods. Columns (1) and (2) of this table report the estimates from multinomial logit regressions that examine the 
likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with the dependent variable as Turnover which takes the value of one if there was a forced turnover 
event and two if there was a voluntary turnover event, and zero otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) of this table report estimates from simple Cox hazard regressions that examine the 
hazard of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with CEO’s dismissal risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. All voluntary 
turnovers are treated as censored, following Brookman and Thistle (2009) and Jenter and Kannan (2015). A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases the likelihood 
of cause-specific CEO turnover. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include year indicators. The t-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Minimum CEO Tenure and Crisis Effect 
 
Table C11 
CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Additional Tests 
Panel A: Minimum Stipulated Time a CEO Should Have Held Office 
Before Leaving. 
(1) (2) 
Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.609* -0.149 0.671* -0.237 
 (1.821) (-0.424) (1.748) (-0.637) 
Systematic ES -0.026 0.064   
 (-0.137) (0.709)   
MES   -0.079 0.045 
   (-0.391) (0.472) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.374 1.099 -0.297 1.109 
 (-0.197) (1.201) (-0.165) (1.253) 
Systematic Returns -1.191 0.247 -1.201* 0.216 
 (-1.624) (0.725) (-1.772) (0.660) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 6.310* -0.345 6.182* 0.318 
 (1.745) (-0.143) (1.844) (0.128) 
Systematic Volatility 0.269 -2.654 1.349 -2.438 
 (0.054) (-0.941) (0.253) (-0.889) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,690 
Log-likelihood -263.5 -908.3 -263.3 -908.4 
Panel B: Controlling for the Impact of Crisis.     
Idiosyncratic ES 0.824*** -0.332 0.821** -0.368 
 (2.893) (-1.038) (2.521) (-1.092) 
Systematic ES 0.023 0.092   
 (0.147) (1.046)   
MES   -0.009 0.066 
   (-0.060) (0.731) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.603 1.079 -0.595 1.180 
 (-0.410) (0.906) (-0.410) (1.006) 
Systematic Returns -0.809 0.236 -0.828 0.190 
 (-1.341) (0.664) (-1.504) (0.569) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.387* 1.015 4.611* 1.439 
 (1.692) (0.421) (1.827) (0.574) 
Systematic Volatility -2.066 -2.150 -1.504 -1.570 
 (-0.496) (-0.893) (-0.356) (-0.700) 
Crisis 0.388 -1.074*** 0.391 -1.072*** 
 (0.953) (-3.445) (0.952) (-3.405) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -345.9 -1039 -345.9 -1039 
This table reports from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with CEO’s  turnover risk 
measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Panel (A) reports the estimates after excluding all those turnover events that take place less than two 
years of a CEO taking her office. Panel (B) controls for the impact of systemic crises using Crisis, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every year-country 
combination in which a systemic banking crisis occurred (as identified by Laeven and Valencia, 2012), and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases 
the hazard of cause-specific CEO turnover. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include year indicators. The t-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Alternative Measures of Banking Market Concentration 
 
 
Table C12 
Forced CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Alternative Measure of Bank Concentration.  
 (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.067*** 1.031*** 
 (2.796) (2.907) 
Systematic ES -0.024  
 (-0.140)  
MES  -0.083 
  (-0.456) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Bank Concentration -3.521*** -3.637*** 
 (-3.938) (-3.849) 
Systematic ES * Bank Concentration 0.207  
 (1.365)  
MES * Bank Concentration  0.273 
  (1.486) 
Bank Concentration -1.266** -1.428*** 
 (-2.520) (-2.792) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.090 0.087 
 (-0.050) (0.056) 
Systematic Returns -0.833* -0.718 
 (-1.700) (-1.599) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 7.774*** 7.504*** 
 (2.642) (3.067) 
Systematic Volatility 0.613 1.362 
 (0.136) (0.319) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -337.1 -333.9 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with CEO’s turnover risk  
measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Bank Concentration is measured as the log of the market share of bank deposits held by top-4 banks 
in each country. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic tail 
risk. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the country level have been shown in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
  
  
58 
Alternative Explanations of the Blanket Guarantee Effect 
 
 
Table C13 
Forced CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Impact of Banking Crises 
Panel A: Impact of Banking Crises (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.925** 0.919** 
 (2.489) (2.165) 
Systematic ES 0.064  
 (0.344)  
MES  0.008 
  (0.046) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Banking Crisis -0.598 -0.616 
 (-1.496) (-1.548) 
Systematic ES * Banking Crisis  -0.049 
  (-0.544) 
MES * Banking Crisis -0.073  
 (-0.777)  
Banking Crisis 0.795 0.714 
 (1.398) (1.227) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.544 -0.599 
 (-0.348) (-0.390) 
Systematic Returns -0.842 -0.895* 
 (-1.469) (-1.812) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.715** 6.218** 
 (2.103) (2.220) 
Systematic Volatility -2.728 -1.848 
 (-0.561) (-0.395) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -347.3 -347.5 
Panel B: Impact of Blanket Guarantee   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.647** 0.660** 
 (2.182) (2.192) 
Systematic ES 1.863  
 (0.168)  
MES  0.034 
  (0.204) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Blanket Guarantee 3.976 4.066 
 (1.178) (1.197) 
Systematic ES * Blanket Guarantee -0.594*  
 (-1.745)  
MES * Blanket Guarantee  -0.570** 
  (-1.960) 
Blanket Guarantee -0.644 -0.927 
 (-0.391) (-0.579) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.433 -0.698 
 (-0.275) (-0.485) 
Systematic Returns -0.905** -0.831* 
 (-1.973) (-1.721) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.184* 4.601* 
 (1.745) (1.777) 
Systematic Volatility -1.321 -2.018 
 (-0.349) (-0.467) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -343.1 -342.2 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with CEO’s turnover risk  
measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Banking Crisis is a measure of panic, which takes a value of one if the country experienced a systemic 
banking crisis in that year. We extract crisis data from the Systemic Banking Crises Database available on the IMF website. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates 
that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk. Blanket Guarantee is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
guarantee covers bank debt in non-systemic crisis periods. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level and shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
